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Inflation Targeting and Exchange Rate Regimes; 
Evidence From the Financial Markets 
 
Abstract 
Inflation targeting is gaining popularity as a framework for conducting monetary policy.  At 
the same time many countries employ some sort of foreign exchange intervention policy 
assuming that these two policies can coexist.  This paper attempts to show that both 
policies are not sustainable.  The potential conflict between the two policies is costly to the 
economy and will eventually result in the abandonment of one of these policies.  Israel is a 
classic test case for two reasons.  First, in the mid to late 90s Israel has struggled to 
maintain both policies.  Second, it has a variety of financial instruments which provide a rich 
source of information.  We test our hypothesis about the conflict using information from the 
financial markets.  The results support the hypothesis that both policies cannot be 
sustained in the long run.  The conclusion is that a credible monetary policy aimed at 
inflation targets should be conducted in a free floating exchange rate regime.  
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I. Introduction 
In recent years inflation targeting (IT) is gaining popularity in both developed and emerging 
market countries as a framework for conducting monetary policy. The success of inflation 
targeting depends critically on the credibility of monetary policy to achieve the inflation 
targets over the relevant horizon1. 
It is generally agreed that a credible IT regime requires a considerable degree of exchange 
rate flexibility (see, for example, Masson, Savastano and Sharma (1997) and Fischer 
(2001)). Indeed, almost all the countries that adopted inflation targeting have floated their 
currency or have moved to more flexible exchange rate regimes. However, as pointed out 
in an article in the Economist (2000) and in a study by Calvo and Reinhart (2000) “labels 
mean little”. Many countries, including inflation targeters, use interest rates or currency 
intervention to influence their exchange rates2.  
Central banks in inflation targeting countries face the following questions:  How strong is the 
conflict between active exchange rate management and inflation targeting? What are the 
consequences of maintaining an exchange rate band in an IT regime? 
The purpose of this paper is to test the extent to which an IT framework is sustainable along 
with an exchange rate band regime using the Israeli experience. Israel is an interesting 
case study for two reasons: One, it has adopted inflation targeting since  
1992 and at the same time has an official exchange rate band whose lower limit (the 
appreciating one) had to be defended in the past. Two, policy makers have at their disposal 
a set of unique forward-looking data which is useful in assessing the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. The data includes: professional inflation forecasts, nominal and real yields 
obtained from nominal bonds and from bonds linked to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as 
well as option premiums obtained from currency options. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: section II provides a brief background of the Israeli 
institutional setup and the data. Section III uses inflation forecasts, the real yield on the CPI 
linked bonds and the yields on nominal bonds to show that: a) monetary policy is effective 
and credible since June 1997 when the Bank Of Israel (BOI) stopped intervening in the FX 
market. b) Monetary policy was ineffective and not credible prior to June 1997 when the  
BOI had to engage in FX sterilized intervention to defend the band’s lower official limit. 
Section IV provides additional evidence, using two sets of FX options data, to show that 
inflation targeting is not sustainable in an FX band regime. Section V provides a summary 
and offers some general lessons based on the Israeli experience. 
  
 
 
4
II. The Institutional Setup and Data 
a. Background 
 In 1992 Israel adopted an inflation targeting policy together with a crawling exchange rate 
band regime3. At first, monetary policy was aimed at the inflation target while the BOI was 
intervening directly in the FX market in an attempt to keep the exchange rate near the 
midpoint of the FX band. This joint effort failed and in February 1996 the BOI changed its 
FX policy and declared a policy of non-intervention within the official limits of the band. This 
change in policy did not stop the ongoing appreciation of the Israeli currency (Shekel) and 
eventually the exchange rate reached the lower edge of the band and got stuck there for 
more than six months. The massive FX purchases during the periods Feb. 1996 to June 
1997 were sterilized by the BOI. When it was realized that the policy is not sustainable, the 
width of the band was increased considerably. Consequently, on June 17 1997 the 
purchases have stopped 4. The BOI has not intervened in the FX market since June 1997.   
This short history, which is divided into two periods, the heavy FX intervention period (Feb. 
1996 to June 1997) and the non-intervention period (June 1997 to June. 2001), provides an 
opportunity to examine empirically the extent of the conflict between inflation targeting and 
FX direct intervention. 
 
b. Data 
Monetary authorities nowadays use various types of forward looking data such as inflation 
forecasts by professionals, forecasts derived from the bond markets, risk premiums derived 
from currency options and other market derived forecasts 5. 
Such data add valuable information to monetary policy makers because it contains 
information which is useful in assessing the credibility of the commitment of monetary policy 
to inflation targeting, with and without FX intervention.  
In Israel such data play an important role in the monthly monetary decision process. Due to 
Israel’s long experience with high inflation, government bonds linked to the CPI with 
maturities up to 15 years are traded regularly on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE). 
Non-linked nominal bonds are also available, for up to 10 years. The difference between 
the nominal and real rates is used as an estimate of inflation expectations for horizons up to 
ten years 6. The one-year ahead market derived inflation expectations measure 7 is among 
the most important gauges of the credibility of the BOI monetary policy. 
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There are also inflation forecasts by professional forecasters which include banks 
as well as other firms and in the past few years have become another source used by 
policymakers. 
In this study we also use two types of FX currency options. The first type is traded daily on 
the TASE and includes European call and put options with maturities up to six months. The 
second type is FX options offered in weekly auctions by the BI.  
Since 1993, the BOI has offered At-The-Money-Forward (ATMF) options for three and six 
months respectively. Since these options have no intrinsic value their price reflects only the 
uncertainty regarding the FX rate. Table 1 provides summary statistics of inflation forecasts, 
actual inflation, the exchange rate and implied volatility.   
The data is used in three ways. First, the information derived from the real and nominal 
bonds is used to assess their influence on inflation forecasts with and without FX 
intervention. Second, the traded FX currency options are used to construct an effective 
exchange rate band, which turns out to be much narrower than the official one and is more 
relevant to the participants in the FX market. Third, the effective band is then used to 
demonstrate the conflict between an IT regime and a crawling FX band regime. 
 
 
 
III.  Credibility of Monetary Policy and FX intervention  
In countries with inflation targeting the central bank steers the short-term interest rate (the 
key rate) under its control to achieve its goal. Changes in the key rate affect, to a large 
extent, future inflation through their effect on inflation expectations and as stated in 
(Svensson (2001), and stressed by Woodford (1999), “…to the extent to which private 
sector expectations, take into account the conduct of monetary policy”.  Thus a key feature 
of the IT regime is its forward-looking nature 8. Since expected inflation should, assuming 
rational expectations, embody all the relevant information regarding the future path of 
inflation it depends on the current and future levels of the key interest rate, the current and 
expected states of economic activity and the exchange rate. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Statistics of Rates of Inflation and Exchange Rates 
Using Monthly Observations For the Period 2/96 – 6/01 
 Mean SD Min Max 
π  5.85 4.01 -0.12 12.93 
eπ  6.40 3.54 0.76 13.72 
S 6.01 5.58 -4.90 19.62 
IV 6.79 - 4.70 11.00 
     
π  The rate of inflation during the last 12 months    
eπ  The one year ahead expected rate of inflation    
S The rate of change of the Shekel Dollar exchange rate in the last 12 
months 
   
IV The implied volatility of the six months BI option    
 
 
     The way that inflation expectations respond to changes in the key rate depends on the 
credibility of the IT regime. The more credible the regime, the stronger the response of the 
inflation expectations to an expected change in the key rate. In reality, however, there never 
is full credibility and inflation expectations are never fully and permanently anchored at the 
desired inflation target.  Rather, inflation expectations are affected by various shocks and 
are conditional, among other factors, on the way monetary policy responds to shocks.  
        Credibility may be adversely affected by various constraints placed on the 
transmission process of monetary policy. One such impeding constraint may be the FX 
regime. Specifically, the existence of an official exchange rate band in a small-open inflation 
targeting economy is a case in point. In such an economy, the exchange rate is an 
important channel through which monetary policy affects inflation (see Svensson (2000) 
and  Haldane and Batini (1998)).  This channel is shut-off when the exchange rate is not 
allowed to appreciate beyond a certain arbitrary rate determined by the lower limit of an 
exchange rate band. When the limit is reached the central bank is forced to engage in 
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sterilization operations which are problematic for well known reasons such as the “quasi-
fiscal” costs of sterilization [see, for example, Calvo (1991) and Kletzer and Spiegel (2000)]  
and the accumulation of national debt which sterilization generates. Moreover, by shutting 
off the exchange rate channel which is the fastest transmission channel, the other main 
channel which affects inflation, the real interest rate – aggregate demand channel, must 
“work harder“ (e.g., meaning a higher unemployment than in a full floating regime). In other 
words, the effectiveness of monetary policy is impaired when the central bank is forced to 
defend the limits of an exchange rate band.  The issue is how sustainable is an IT regime 
when exchange rate movements are restricted by an effective band. 
        The effect of an FX band in an inflation targeting regime is tested next. As stated 
above, inflation expectations are affected by the monetary policy and also by 
economic activity. The hypothesis which we test is that the FX band severely hampers 
the effectiveness of monetary policy. When the exchange rate is at the lower limit of 
the exchange rate band, inflation expectations react differently to the expected changes 
in the key rate than when the exchange rate is freely floating inside the band. Figure 1 
depicts the evolution of the exchange rate within the official band. 
To minimize the effect of autocorrelation, present in our time-series data, we test the 
hypothesis using first differences in the following equation 
     
)1(211 tttott eRSbibbE +∆−∆−=∆ +π  
where  1+∆ ttE π   is the change in the 12-month ahead average inflation forecast, i∆  is 
the change in the difference between the daily key interest rate and the one year 
nominal rate on a zero coupon Treasury note.  A fall in the one year rate relative to the 
key rate, according to the pure expectations hypothesis, means that future key rates are 
expected to fall.  Such a change means that the current tight monetary stance is 
expected to loosen. If the commitment to inflation targeting is credible and expectations 
take into account the conduct of monetary policy then b1 < 0. 
The variable RS∆  is the change in the difference between the real yields to maturity on CPI 
linked bonds for 1 and 15 years respectively.  A rise in the one year real rate relative to the 
15 years rate is a signal of an expected slow down in economic activity which decelerates 
inflation forecasts. The inclusion of a variable representing the expected state of economic 
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activity is important because an expected slowdown, lowers, cetirus paribus, both 
inflationary pressures and inflation expectations for any given key rate.     
We are fully aware that equation 1 is an incomplete model of inflation expectations.   
Its only purpose, however, is to test the impediment that an FX regime imposes on the  
monetary transmission mechanism, the link between the key rate and inflation  
expectations.9 The conventional approach includes the rate of inflation or lagged inflation in 
the regressions and the coefficients are used as a test of credibility of the regime. See, for 
example, Gurkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2005) or Ball and Sheridan (2004) who use 
OECD forecasts. 
There are numerous empirical studies10 which use the slope of the nominal yield curve as a 
predictor of economic activity.  Here we use the slope of the real yield curve which should 
be even a better proxy of economic activity.   
To test our hypothesis we focus on the difference between two periods. The first is from 
February 1996 to June 1997. During this period the exchange rate was stuck at the lower 
edge of the band for forty percent of the time.  During the rest of the time it was very close 
to the lower limit (never more than 5.7 percent from the lower limit). The central bank was 
forced to buy dollars to defend the lower limit. Since the BOI was committed to the   inflation 
target, it had no choice but to engage in sterilizing the effects of its intervention. In the first 
six months of 1997 alone the BOI purchased and sterilized more than 7 billion dollars. The 
second period is from June 1997 to June 2001. During this period the BOI did not intervene 
directly in the FX market, including the Russian default crisis and the Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) debacle (fall of 1998) during which the exchange rate rose about 15 
percent above the lower limit. We tested the difference in the two periods using the 
following regressions: a regression for the whole period and for the two sub periods; the 
intervention period and the non-intervention period. To test the sensitivity of the results to 
the unusual events, the Russian/LTCM crises that took place in October and November of 
1998, we have introduced a dummy variable in the second period regression. The results 
are presented in Table 2. 
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                                                                 Table 2 
The Effect of Monetary Policy on Inflation Expectations in an FX Band Regime* 
  
 
Periods 
b0 b1 b2 Dummy 
2R  D.W. 
2-1996 to 6-2001 -0.09 -0.37 -0.52  0.33 1.81 
 (-1.39) (-2.20) (-1.86)    
2-1996 to 6-1997 -0.04 0.11 0.01  0.02 2.03 
 (-0.36) (0.42) (0.02)    
7-1997 to 6-2001 -0.14 -0.67 -0.43  0.54 1.55 
 (-1.82) (-3.65) (-1.49)    
7-1997 to 6-2001 
(Dummy) 
-0.19 -0.54 -0.33 2.00 0.74 1.82 
 (-3.21) (-3.78) (-1.49) (5.22)   
 
*The statistics in Table 2 are obtained from the regression given in equation 1.  The 
numbers in parentheses are t-values.  The dummy variable is for the October and 
November 1998 period to test the effect of this unusual period. 
 
The message of the results is clear. First, for the period as whole, Feb. 1996 to June. 2001, 
the results are consistent with our expectation 00 21 << bandb . Tighter monetary 
policy, increasing the key rate, reduces inflation expectations and an increase in the slack 
in the economy, as proxied by the real interest rate gap, also reduces expected inflation.  
Second, there is a significant difference between the two periods. During the Feb. 1996 to 
June 1997 period, when the exchange rate was at, or very close to, the lower limit of the 
band and the BOI intervened heavily in the FX market, changes in inflation expectations 
were not  related either to i∆  or to RS∆ . That is, they responded neither to changes in the 
monetary stance nor to changes in the variable representing the output gap.   
In sharp contrast to the first period, in the July 1997 to June 2001 period, the non-
intervention period, both b1 and b2 are negative as expected and the R2 of the regression 
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indicates that overall our simple model is a good representation of the relationship 
between inflation expectations and the BOI policies. The difference between the two 
periods can be explained by the difference in the credibility of the commitment to inflation 
targeting. This commitment was not very credible in the first period when the BOI had to 
defend the exchange rate and had to sterilize its purchases of foreign currency. Monetary 
policy at that time was in effect facing the situation described by Sargent and Wallace 
(1981) as “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”. In the second period, however, there was no 
FX intervention and the commitment to inflation targeting was much more credible. 
          To test the robustness of the results, given the special circumstances in the fall of 
1998, we have introduced a dummy variable for this period. The results in row 4 show that 
although the dummy variable is positive and significant, it does not change the  nature of 
the earlier results. In particular the coefficient of 1b , the effect of the monetary stance, 
remains negative and significant. The coefficient 2b  remains negative but not significant, as 
before.  Moreover, the exclusion of this period has improved the total fit of the relationships 
presented in equation (1). 
            The above results show that in circumstances like the ones described here, 
monetary policy is ineffective and the transmission mechanism is hampered by the 
exchange rate policy. 
 
 
IV. Sustainability of Inflation Targeting and an Exchange Rate Band 
This section provides further evidence of the conflict between inflation targeting and the 
exchange rate policy.  Many countries, in the past, have followed such policies in an 
attempt to strike a balance between the exchange rate and inflation11. Maintaining such a 
balance is rather problematic in countries with a long history of high inflation and a high 
pass-through from the exchange rate to consumer prices. In such countries, the efforts to 
reduce inflation through a tight monetary policy requires a consistent fiscal policy 
framework.  
Pursuing a policy of sterilized FX intervention, with its “quasi fiscal costs”, whose burden is 
not internalized in a transparent12 way by the fiscal authorities, is clearly inconsistent with a 
tight monetary policy stance. The key rate deemed appropriate for achieving the inflation 
target may also affect the equilibrium FX rate, causing the domestic currency to appreciate. 
Since, however, the exchange rate is not allowed to appreciate below the lower limit of the 
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FX band, maintaining the band simultaneously with the IT regime may prove 
to be unsustainable. Simply put, the commitment to fight inflation may result in the 
abandonment of the FX regime. 
One way to detect in advance the conflict between the two policies is to examine the 
relationship between a tight monetary policy and expected FX uncertainty. If raising  
the key rate results in greater expected exchange rate uncertainty which means a higher 
probability of either a large appreciation or depreciation, it would point to a potential 
breakup of the twin policies.  A higher probability of a large appreciation means that 
breaching the lower limit of the FX band is more likely and a higher probability of a large 
depreciation means that the inflation target may be violated because of the pass through 
from the exchange rates to consumer prices13. 
To test the relationship between the key rate and expected FX volatility we introduce a 
straight forward simple regression 
       0 1P R M a a K R v= + +       (2) 
Expected exchange rate volatility is represented by the dependent variable PRM, which is 
the option premium14 of the six months at-the-money-forward (ATMF) calls offered in 
weakly tenders by the BOI.  The variable KR stands for the key rate and v is an error term. 
The data, PRM and KR, consists of weekly observations, which corresponds to the day 
(normally a Tuesday) on which the option is auctioned off by the BOI.  
The above relationship is tested for the whole period Feb 1996 to June 2001 and for the 
two sub-periods: I. the period when the exchange rate was inside the band and sub-period 
II when the exchange rate was stuck at the lower limit of the band.  
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        Table3 
Test of the Sustainability of Inflation Targeting and the FX Band* 
 
oa 1a 2R  DW 
Period I: 7-1997 to 6-2001 1.17 0.03 0.58 2.42 
(2.72) (2.67)   
Period II: 2-1996 to 6-1997 - 1.98 0.25 0.66 1.93 
(-3.75) (6.92)   
Total Period: 2/1996 – 6/2001 1.37 0.05 0.66 2.47 
(4.27) (1.83)   
 
 
* The regressions in rows 1 and 2 were estimated using the AR procedure. The coefficients of AR 
were respectively 0.72 and 0.76. This procedure was applied because of high serial correlation of 
the error terms. There was no serial correlation present in the second period regression. The 
numbers in parenthesis are t-values. 
 
 
The results in Table 3 confirm our hypothesis that tighter monetary policy is associated with 
greater FX uncertainty when the exchange rate is restricted by a band, a1 > 0 and is 
statistically significant in all three periods examined.  This result is particularly strong during 
the BOI intervention period (period II), when the exchange rate was stuck at the lower edge 
of the band. During that period, a one percentage point rise in the key rate (KR) resulted in 
a 0.25 percentage point increase in FX uncertainty as measured by the premium on the FX 
call option (PRM). Not surprisingly the conflict between inflation targeting and  
the FX band regime was particularly strong in the second period.  Even when the exchange 
rate was inside the band, in period I, and no FX intervention took place the evidence points 
to this conflict, a significant positive coefficient, a1, though its magnitude is much smaller.  
The mere existence of an FX band is enough to potentially create a conflict.  
Though these results are significant they may understate the extent of the conflict described 
above. To see this consider the effect on FX uncertainty of narrowing the band while 
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holding the key rate unchanged. A narrower band implies, ceteris paribus, a higher 
probability of violating the band’s limits which should result in higher expected volatility of 
the exchange rate. A narrower band does not necessarily involve narrowing the official 
limits of the band. Instead, the band could effectively get narrower as a result of monetary 
policy.  For the purpose at hand, the lower limit of the effective band is the official one, but 
the upper limit is effectively determined by the credibility of the policy to achieve the 
inflation target and the existing pass- through from the exchange rate to consumer prices.  
The upper effective limit, which is much lower than the official upper limit, reflects the 
public’s perception regarding the ability of BOI to attain the inflation targets specified by the 
government.  This perception takes into account high pass-through, from the exchange rate 
to prices in Israel, which could interfere with the attainment of the inflation target.  Thus, 
given this pass through, and as long as the exchange rate is inside the band, the more 
credible monetary policy becomes in reducing inflation the lower is the probability of  
a depreciation of the currency. I.e. the lower is the effective upper limit of the band.   
We next construct the upper effective limit which we need as a basis for our extended test 
of the sustainability of the twin policies.  To construct the “effective” upper limit we used FX 
currency options with varying strike prices traded on the TASE. On any given trading day 
we searched for an out-of-the-money call option with the highest available strike price for 
which some minimal positive premium has been paid15. We mark the exchange rate 
corresponding to the strike price of this option as a point on the effective upper limit. This 
procedure is repeated for each trading day starting in February 1996 to June 2001. The 
result is an effective upper edge, which is depicted in Figure  2. 
 The effective FX band provides interesting information. First, from February 1996 to 
November 1998, just after the Russian/LTCM crises the effective band was only 4.4 percent 
wide with a standard deviation of 1.6 percent. As was mentioned earlier, during this period 
the parameters of the official band changed twice. These changes had little effect on the  
width of the effective band, which we use in our next test and is represented by VK.  The 
following test expands the test of equation (2), by adding the width of the FX band, VK, as 
an explanatory variable in the following equation. 
1 2 ,oPRM a a KR a VK= + + (3) 
FX expected volatility, PRM, should be also affected, for a given key rate (KR), by the width 
of the exchange rate band. 
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The results, presented in Table 4, are interesting in several respects. First, we find 
once again, as in Table 3, that a rise in the key rate results in greater FX uncertainty.  
This is true when the exchange rate was inside band (first row second column) and 
particularly so when the exchange rate is stuck at the lower band’s limit (second row 
second column). 
                                                                 Table 4 
Tests of the Sustainability of Inflation Targeting With an Effective FX Band* 
   
oa  1a  2a  
2R  DW  
Period I: 7/1997 - 6/2001    0.94 0.026 3.96 0.64 2.30 
   (4.80) (3.50) (7.70)   
        
Period II: 2/1996 - 6/1997    -0.80 0.15 8.41 0.68 2.18 
   (-0.88) (2.12) (1.57)   
        
Total Period: 2/1996 - 
6/2001  
  1.00 0.05 4.26 0.65 2.30 
   (5.30) (3.19) (8.60)   
 
* These regressions, for the total period and period I, are estimated using the RA 
procedure. The coefficients of AR were 0.57 and 0.6 respectively. This procedure was 
applied because of high serial correlation in the OLS version. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-values. 
 
Second, when the exchange rate is inside the band, a wider effective band is associated, 
as expected, with larger FX uncertainty (first row third column). However, when the 
exchange rate is stuck at the band’s lower limit the width of the effective band does not 
seem to affect exchange rate uncertainty. 
Third, adding VK improves somewhat the overall fit of the period I regression, but not the 
one for period II.  That is, when the exchange rate is stuck at the lower limit of the  
band, not only is an increase in the key rate ineffective in reducing inflation expectations but 
it also points to an increase in exchange rate volatility. That is, a tighter monetary policy 
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leads in this case to a higher probability of either, a large appreciation of the exchange 
rate (possibly breaching the lower limit of the band.). Or, a large depreciation of the 
exchange rate which might, via the pass through, cause inflation to be higher than the 
target16.  
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
The main question addressed here is the following, could a country simultaneously commit 
itself to an inflation target and an exchange rate band. The inherent conflict between the 
two remained even after the band was widened considerably. 
Is the Israeli experience relevant for inflation targeting countries with no official band but 
with direct currency intervention. Could the case be made, for inflation targeting countries, 
that intervention could be useful “so long as they are not perceived as trying to defend a 
particular rate” as stated by Fischer (2001). We doubt that it is possible to maintain an 
intervention policy in an inflation targeting regime.  The fact that very few central banks 
disclose information regarding their FX intervention means, in our judgment, that they 
themselves cannot clearly distinguish between intervention to keep “orderly markets” and 
intervention aimed to affect the exchange rate because it is “clearly away from 
fundamentals.” 
Even an implicit exchange rate band might lead to conflicts such as in Israel. In the last 
decade there has been a range of exchange rate regimes with straight dollarization or 
currency board on the one hand and various degrees of floating on the other hand.  
The results of this study suggest that maintaining a credible inflation targeting regime is 
sustainable only if we view the exchange rate as a financial asset whose value is 
determined by market forces.  
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Endnotes 
 
1. Inflation targets differ from country to country. The specification involves target 
horizons, the price index used, target range or points, escape clauses and who sets the 
target (the government or the central banks). Though the U.S. does not have an explicit 
inflation target, Ben Bernanke, the current Fed chairmanis a long time proponent of 
explicit inflation targets. 
2. An example of such a policy was the international concerted effort to support the Euro 
in Sept. 2000. 
3. The FX band is vis-à-vis a currency basket which is based on the currencies of Israel’s 
main trading partners where the dollar has about 60 percent of the weight and the 
Euro’s weight is about 25 percent. 
4. On that day, an asymmetric change in the slopes of the band was introduced; six 
percent for the upper limit and four percent for the lower limit. An additional 
decrease to a slope of two percent of the lower limit was introduced in June 1998. 
The band was finally eliminated in May 2005. 
5.  For example, the Bank of England is routinely engaged in extracting data from financial 
markets to assess its monetary stance. Information from FX currency options has been 
used to assess the credibility of official exchange rate target zones (e.g. Campa and 
Chang (1996)). 
6. This estimate may be biased upwards since it may include a premium for inflation 
uncertainty. Since, in recent years, inflation has declined considerably so did the  
uncertainty surrounding it. We believe, therefore, that the risk premium is minuscule, 
and that the estimate of inflation expectations is only slightly biased. 
7.  For the details on the derivation of inflation expectations in Israel see Yariv (1990). 
8. See for example, the survey by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). 
9. There is a compelling reason why equation (1) was specified as a first difference rather 
than a level equation.  During the period under consideration, there was a world-wide 
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downtrend of inflation, inflation expectations, and interest rates.  This 
was also true for many previously high inflation countries such as Israel. Thus, if (1) 
were specified as a level equation, a valid  criticisim might be that any result pointing to 
the expected negative effect of the expected key rate on expected inflation does not 
reflect credibility but rather is a spurious result hiding the true international pressures 
which were the driving force behind the decline in both.  The same argument cannot be 
claimed for a first difference specification. There are two additional reasons for 
specifying (1) as a first difference equation:  a) to reduce the effects that persistent 
shocks might have on inflation expectations and b) to reduce the effects that gradual 
policy responses to shocks (interest rate smoothing) might have on inflation 
expectations.  
10. Among related studies are Estrella and Mishkin (1997) and Smets and Tsatsaronis 
(1997) where the test is for more than one country.  A recent study by Neiss and Nelson 
(2001) argues that the interest rate gap (the difference between the current and the 
natural rate of interest) might be a better predictor of future inflation than the output gap. 
11. This possible trade-off is pointed out by Fischer (2001) who considers it to be 
analogues to the Phillips curve tradeoff. 
12. The cost of sterilization is internalized by the fiscal authorities in a transparent way if 
there are explicit arrangements where the Treasury covers Central Bank’s losses 
stemming from sterilization operations. Such an arrangement is provided in the New 
Zealand Reserve Bank Act of 1984. This is not the case in Israel and in many other 
countries. 
13. Bufman and Leiderman (2001) estimated an average pass-through coefficient of 40 
percent over the first 10 quarters after the shock while Elkayam (2001) reports an 
immediate pass through of 25 percent.  
14. For ATMF options the premium is mainly determined by volatility.  In the Black-Scholes 
model there is a one to one correspondence between option premiums and implied 
volatility. 
15. To control for the changing time to maturity of the option we decided to use a constant 
75 days to maturity.  Since only on few occasions the maturity is of 75 days we have 
used options which originally had 60 days and 90 days to maturity and constructed a 
weighted average price of these two options. 
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16. It should be mentioned that the results presented in tables (3) and (4) may be 
affected by omitted variables in equations (2) and (3).  We do not believe, however, that 
the bias, if there is one is different in the two periods that we have tested. 
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                                                       FIGURE 1 
EXCHANGE RATE BAND AND CONSUMER PRICE LEVEL (1/1/95-6/30/01) 
 
FIGURE 2 
THE EFFECTIVE UPPER EXCHANGE RATE BAND, THE OFFICIAL LOWER BAND  
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AND THE ACTUAL EXCHANGE RATE   )2/1/96- 6/30/01(  
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